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Notes
DRONES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:
REDEFINING EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY
MATTHEW R. KOERNER†
ABSTRACT
Drones have gained notoriety as a weapon against foreign terrorist
targets; yet, they have also recently made headlines as an instrument
for domestic surveillance. With their sophisticated capabilities and
continuously decreasing costs, it is not surprising that drones have
attracted numerous consumers—most notably, law enforcement.
Courts will likely soon have to decipher the limits on the
government’s use of drones under the Fourth Amendment. But it is
unclear where, or even whether, drones would fall under the current
jurisprudence. Because of their diverse and sophisticated designs and
capabilities, drones might be able to maneuver through the Fourth
Amendment’s doctrinal loopholes.
This Note advocates analyzing drones under an adapted approach
to the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test in Katz v. United States.
Courts should focus more on the test’s oft-neglected first prong—
whether a person exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy—and
analyze what information falls within the scope of that expectation,
excluding information knowingly exposed to the plain view of the
public. This analysis also considers instances when, although a
subjective expectation exists, it may be impossible or implausible to
reasonably exhibit that expectation, a dilemma especially relevant to
an analysis of drones.
Courts that adopt the recommended analysis would have a
coherent and comprehensible approach to factually dynamic cases
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challenging the constitutionality of drone surveillance. Until then, the
constitutional uncertainties of these cases will likely linger.

INTRODUCTION
Senator Dianne Feinstein, a staunch advocate of governmental
1
surveillance and Chairman of the 113th Congress’s Senate
2
Intelligence Committee, recently found herself, rather ironically, as
3
the target of surveillance. One day at her home, Senator Feinstein
walked to the window to check on a protest that was taking place
4
5
outside. Much to her surprise, a small drone hovered on the other
6
side of the window, only inches away, spying on her. The drone
7
immediately flew away.
Senator Feinstein’s experience is just one example of drones
being used for surveillance within the United States. But her story
8
and others like it have sparked significant controversy over the use of
drones for domestic surveillance, which falls within a broader debate

1. See Spencer Ackerman, Feinstein Promotes Bill to Strengthen NSA’s Hand on
Warrantless Searches, GUARDIAN (Nov. 15, 2013, 10:02 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/nov/15/feinstein-bill-nsa-warrantless-searches-surveillance.
2. Members, U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, http://www.intelligence.
senate.gov/memberscurrent.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2014).
3. Kathryn A. Wolfe, Dianne Feinstein Spots Drone Inches from Face, POLITICO (Jan. 15,
2014, 4:15 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/01/senator-dianne-feinstein-encounter-withdrone-technology-privacy-surveillance-102233.html. This is not the first time that Senator
Feinstein has been the subject of surveillance. See Mark Mazzetti & Carl Hulse, Inquiry by
C.I.A. Affirms It Spied on Senate Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2014, at A1 (“An internal
investigation by the C.I.A. has found that its officers penetrated a computer network used by
the Senate Intelligence Committee [chaired by Feinstein and] . . . read the emails of the Senate
[staff] . . . .”).
4. Wolfe, supra note 3. The crowd was supposedly protesting the National Security
Agency’s spying program. Id.
5. The technology often referred to as “drones” is also called Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAV), Uninhabited Aerial Systems (UAS), Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV), and Remotely
Operated Aircrafts (ROA). STEVEN J. ZALOGA, UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES: ROBOTIC
AIR WARFARE 1917–2007, at 2 (2008). This Note uses “drone” to refer to all of these initialisms
and, specifically, for any unmanned, electronic or mechanical instrument that flies and uses
sensory technology to acquire information. It uses this term not because of any associated
negative connotations but because of public familiarity with the term “drone.”
6. Wolfe, supra note 3.
7. Id.
8. Cf. Jason Koebler, North Dakota Man Sentenced to Jail in Controversial Drone-Arrest
Case, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/01/
15/north-dakota-man-sentenced-to-jail-in-controversial-drone-arrest-case (reporting on the first
person to be arrested and convicted of a crime based on evidence obtained by drone
surveillance).
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9

on privacy and governmental surveillance programs. Advocates of
robust federal surveillance policies champion governmental
surveillance as the only way to prevent terrorist and cyber attacks
10
against the United States. President Barack Obama defended these
surveillance programs as “‘modest encroachments on privacy’” that
“strik[e] the ‘right balance’ between national security and civil
11
liberties.”
In comparison, privacy advocates envision these
surveillance programs leading to a dystopian, totalitarian government
12
watching over its citizenry—undetected but omnipresent.
13
14
References to George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four abound.
9. See Andy Pasztor & Jack Nicas, Drone Plan Draws Privacy Concerns, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 7, 2013, 7:58 PM, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303309504579183
711382731676 (reporting that a federal plan to integrate drones into the national airspace “riled
critics seeking greater attention to privacy protections” at a time of “heightened public and
congressional concern about the government’s surveillance capabilities”); see also Peter Finn &
Ellen Nakashima, Obama Defends Sweeping Surveillance Standards, WASH. POST, June 7, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-defends-sweeping-surveillance-efforts/2013/06/
07/2002290a-cf88-11e2-9f1a-1a7cdee20287_story.html (“[President Barack] Obama said it was
‘healthy for our democracy’ to have an open discussion about the balance between privacy and
security concerns . . . .”).
10. See David E. Sanger & Thom Shanker, N.S.A. Director Firmly Defends Surveillance
Efforts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2013, at A15 (reporting that the Director of the National Security
Agency, General Keith Alexander, defended the agency’s surveillance programs as the only
option to prevent terrorist and cyber attacks against the United States and stated that to do so,
the United States must expand these surveillance programs).
11. Justin Sink, Obama Defends NSA Surveillance Programs as ‘Right Balance’, HILL (June
7, 2013, 6:07 PM), http://thehill.com/video/administration/304165-obama-defends-nsa-programsas-striking-right-balance. President Obama’s statement seems to be the antithesis of Benjamin
Franklin’s famous warning on trading liberty for safety: “Those who would give up essential
Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.” J.A. LEO
LEMAY, 3 THE LIFE OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN: SOLDIER, SCIENTIST, AND POLITICIAN, 1748–
1757, at 474 (2009).
12. See Pasztor & Nicas, supra note 9 (discussing a bill introduced by U.S. Senator Ed
Markey to establish privacy rules governing the use of drones to protect Americans from “‘spies
in the sky,’” and the passage of drone-privacy laws in eight states during 2013).
13. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949). Nineteen Eighty-Four has
frequently been cited as the poster child for a dystopian, totalitarian government that constantly
surveils its citizenry. See sources cited infra note 14.
14. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 466–67 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(discussing governmental surveillance and referencing Nineteen Eighty-Four by George Orwell);
M. Ryan Calo, The Drone as Privacy Catalyst, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 29, 32 (2011) (same);
Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the ‘Reasonable Expectation of Privacy’: An Emerging Tripartite
Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1078–79 (1987) (same). In United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct.
945 (2012), the Supreme Court considered a question particularly relevant to drones and their
ability to track individuals: whether the government may place a Global Positioning System
(GPS) on an individual’s vehicle and track her public movements without a warrant. Id. at 948.
During oral arguments in Jones, Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four was mentioned six times. See
Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, 25, 27, 33, 35, 57, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259).
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Apart from the surrounding privacy-concerns debate, drones
currently provide many practical benefits and their projected
15
applications seem limitless. Based on their obvious advantage of
being unmanned, drones have the capability to conduct missions
previously considered too risky, dangerous, or impracticable. These
applications are also provided at continuously decreasing costs and
with the latest technological sophistication, such as the capability to
see through physical obstructions, to detect various chemical and
biological agents in the air, to recognize human faces and license
16
plates, and to fly in strategic, coordinated formations.
As has frequently been the case, however, the benefits of
technological advancement come with the risk of abuse and
17
harassment. These risks are greater when the technology is utilized
18
by government entities. This Note examines the challenges that the
United States faces in addressing those risks and harmonizing the
conflict between government and technology. Has privacy prospered
or foundered through the development of technology? More
specifically, how will the burgeoning swarm of drones over American
soil affect domestic law enforcement, and how will these effects
19
withstand Fourth Amendment scrutiny?

15. See infra notes 143–49 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 150–54 and accompanying text, and Part II.B.
17. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 240 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (describing the Court’s role of “ensur[ing] that Fourth Amendment
rights would retain their vitality as technology expanded the Government’s capacity to commit
unsuspected intrusions into private areas and activities”); id. (concluding that the majority
opinion’s approach “will not protect Fourth Amendment rights, but rather will permit their
gradual decay as technology advances”); see, e.g., United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272,
276 (7th Cir. 2011) (describing GPS as “a technology surely capable of abuses fit for a dystopian
novel”), vacated and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 1534 (2012); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S.
27, 33–34 (2001) (“It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens
by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.”).
18. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[T]he Government’s
unrestrained power to assemble data . . . is susceptible to abuse.”); see also Riley v. California,
134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring) (“Many forms of modern technology are
making it easier and easier for both government and private entities to amass a wealth of
information about the lives of ordinary Americans . . . .”).
19. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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Drones, with their current and projected capabilities, present a
perfect storm of issues that fall outside of current Fourth Amendment
20
jurisprudence but still appear to implicate the Fourth Amendment.
Drones can maneuver through each and every loophole of the
21
jurisprudence for warrantless searches. They travel on public
airways at low or high altitudes, undetected and with little or no
22
undue noise, nuisance, or threat to persons or property. They can
utilize sense-enhancing technologies that are, or will soon be, in
23
general public use. And drones can use these technologies to gather
an abundance of intimate details and information, previously
24
impossible or impracticable to acquire. Law enforcement is likely to
25
increasingly use drones for domestic surveillance, and this will likely
26
propel drones to the forefront of courts’ dockets.
Scholars have written exhaustively on many aspects of the
Fourth Amendment, and its intersection with drones has recently

20. See Scott Bomboy, A Legal Victory for Drones Warrants a Fourth Amendment
Discussion, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (Feb. 7, 2014), http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2014/02/acourt-victory-for-drones-warrants-a-fourth-amendment-discussion (“For now, there doesn’t
seem to be a clear-cut answer [on drone surveillance under the Fourth Amendment] . . . .”).
21. This Note addresses exclusively warrantless surveillance by drones. It does not
advocate a blanket prohibition of the use of drones, their technology, or even a prohibition of
their use by law enforcement or public entities. Drones provide numerous advantages in both
the private and public setting. Their integration and expansion into the airspace under the FAA
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (FAA Modernization Act) is greatly needed. For lawenforcement purposes, drones may provide the greatest advancement in decades—minimizing
risk to police officers, expanding available information, and reducing policing expenses.
These positive aspects, however, do not negate the virtues of requiring warrants in
certain situations. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493 (“[T]he warrant requirement is ‘an important
working part of our machinery of government,’ not merely ‘an inconvenience to be somehow
“weighed” against the claims of police efficiency.’” (citation omitted)). Requiring warrants for
certain governmental intrusions protects society’s privacy expectations and the minimum
guarantees of the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, this system promotes the credibility of lawenforcement surveillance because of the ex ante review of the intrusion by a judge, requiring
probable cause before authorizing a warrant.
22. See infra Part III.B.
23. See infra notes 204–05 and accompanying text.
24. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
25. See Koebler, supra note 8 (reporting on the first person to be arrested and convicted of
a crime based on evidence obtained by drone surveillance).
26. Current events will also likely accelerate the use of drones. See infra text accompanying
notes 153–58. But see Jeff Pegues, Some Drone Decisions Expected Soon, with Final Rules
Likely Years Away, CBS NEWS (Dec. 29, 2014, 11:26 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/somedrone-decisions-expected-soon-with-final-rules-likely-years-away (“[I]t is nearly certain that the
FAA will not meet [the September 2015] deadline. Instead, 2017 seems to be a more realistic
time frame.”).
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27

received significant attention. Much of the literature on drones and
the Fourth Amendment recognizes that it is unclear where—and
whether—drones fall within current jurisprudence, and recommends
28
a variety of legislative solutions. But although scholars identify the
legal uncertainties with drones, those recommending legislative action
endorse a partial solution that only perpetuates the problem that the
courts have maintained with respect to technology and the Fourth
Amendment. Specifically, just as current Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence has failed to keep pace with advancing technology, a
29
legislative approach will also trail behind. This Note addresses these

27. A Westlaw search through law reviews and journals for pieces, published before
January 1, 2015, that use the words “drones,” “search,” and “Fourth Amendment” recovered
250 pieces. Of these, eighty-five were published in 2014; seventy-four were published in 2013;
thirty-eight were published in 2012; twelve were published in 2011; and forty-one were
published before 2011, the earliest in 1991. For example, see generally Timothy T. Takahashi,
Drones and Privacy, 14 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 72 (2013); John Villasenor, Observations
from Above: Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Privacy, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457 (2013);
Philip J. Hiltner, Comment, The Drones Are Coming: Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for
Police Surveillance and Its Fourth Amendment Implications, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 397
(2013); Troy Roberts, Comment, On the Radar: Government Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and
Their Effect on Public Privacy Interests from Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence and Legislative
Policy Perspectives, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 491 (2009); Andrew B. Talai, Comment, Drones and
Jones: The Fourth Amendment and Police Discretion in the Digital Age, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 729
(2014).
28. See, e.g., Calo, supra note 14, at 29 (arguing that drones may be the “catalyst” to “drag
privacy law into the twenty-first century”); Roberts, supra note 27, at 516 (arguing that the
Fourth Amendment provides few protections against the government’s use of drones for
surveillance and that legislative and regulatory action is necessary); Villasenor, supra note 27, at
508 (arguing for law-enforcement policies and legislation to govern drone usage); see also
Richard M. Thompson II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42701, DRONES IN DOMESTIC
SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS: FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS AND LEGISLATIVE
RESPONSES (Apr. 3, 2013), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42701.pdf; Bart Elias, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R42718, PILOTLESS DRONES: BACKGROUND AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR
CONGRESS REGARDING UNMANNED AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS IN THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE
SYSTEM (Sept. 10, 2012), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42718.pdf; cf. Riley v. California, 134 S.
Ct. 2473, 2497–98 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring) (“Legislatures, elected by the people, are in a
better position than we are to assess and respond to the [technological] changes that have
already occurred and those that almost certainly will take place in the future.”).
29. A successful legislative approach to drones, or more broadly to governmental
surveillance, is also in many ways unrealistic and unlikely based on the current political context
and on Congress’s legislative record on Fourth Amendment–like protections. In over 225 years
since the Bill of Rights was enacted, many of the significant restrictions on governmental
investigations have emerged from the courts, rather than Congress. The Supreme Court has
frequently stepped in, or perhaps was forced to step in, to uphold the minimum guarantees
against unreasonable searches provided by the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Riley v.
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014) (holding that the police may not, without a warrant,
search through digital information on an arrestee’s cell phone); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 353 (1967) (holding that the police may not, without a warrant, wiretap and listen to a
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issues and recommends an adaptive approach to Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence in the age of the drone.
For these reasons, it is highly probable that courts will soon
confront issues regarding the use of drones for domestic
30
surveillance. This Note argues that when these issues arise, courts
should apply the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test expounded in
31
Katz v. United States, and, in doing so, expand on the subjectiveexpectation-of-privacy requirement. This oft-neglected element of the
two-pronged test provides critical analysis that is especially relevant
to cases involving drones. In further analyzing and clarifying the
subjective-expectation requirement, courts should proceed in three
steps. First, they should determine whether the surveilled person
“exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy”—the
person’s phone call from a public telephone booth); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961)
(holding that evidence obtained from an unconstitutional search may not be admitted at trial as
evidence). The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012),
is one rare example of a legislative approach to Fourth Amendment issues.
A legislative solution is unrealistic also because of the current political context. A
politician who attempts to support legislative action that would implement a robust protection
against governmental surveillance by drones might be attacked as being “soft on crime.” See
BRANDON C. WELSH & DAVID P. FARRINGTON, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIME
PREVENTION 491 (2012) (“It has often been observed that getting tough with [criminal]
offenders carries political benefits.”). This political fodder would likely dissuade many
politicians, as it has in other contexts in the past, from proposing or voting in favor of a
legislative solution similar to those proposed by the sources above. See sources cited supra note
28. Therefore, a legislative solution is unlikely.
Nonetheless, there are some jurists who have advocated for legislative solutions to
remedy complex Fourth Amendment issues. See, e.g., Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2497 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (“In light of [technological] developments, it would be very unfortunate if privacy
protection in the 21st century were left primarily to the federal courts using the blunt instrument
of the Fourth Amendment.”); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 51 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“It would be far wiser to give legislators an unimpeded opportunity to grapple with
these emerging issues [concerning technology] rather than to shackle them with prematurely
devised constitutional constraints.”). Although these jurists might believe that a legislative
solution is preferable, they do not acknowledge that it is likely to occur.
In light of this legislative apathy, it is therefore critical to understand where the Fourth
Amendment sets the floor of rights for individuals and what restrictions there are on
governmental surveillance by drones.
30. Cf. Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion to Dismiss at *12, North
Dakota v. Brossart, Nos. 32-2011-CR-00049, 00071, 32-2011-CR-00074, 32-2011-CR-00050,
00076, 32-2011-CR-00046, 32-2011-CR-00048, 32-2011-CR-00047 (N.D. Dist. Ct. July 31, 2012),
available
at
https://www.nacdl.org/uploadedFiles/files/news_and_the_champion/DDIC/
Brossart%20Order.pdf (denying a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, to suppress evidence
obtained by a drone because “[t]here was no improper use of a [drone]”); Bomboy, supra note
20 (reporting on the first case where a person was arrested and convicted of a crime based on
evidence obtained by a drone).
31. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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threshold issue in order for the Fourth Amendment to apply.
Second, if the person held a subjective expectation of privacy, courts
should evaluate the scope of that privacy expectation. And third, they
should determine whether the person “expose[d] [information] to the
‘plain view’ of outsiders” and whether the evidence at issue fell within
33
the scope of that exposure.
This Note analyzes drones under current Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence and suggests an adapted approach to Fourth
Amendment doctrine to help remedy many of the problems
presented by drones. Part I discusses Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence relevant to an analysis of drone technology. Part II
provides an overview of the current market for drones, as well as
their current designs and capabilities. Part III analyzes the current
doctrinal failings of the relevant Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
when applied to drones. Finally, Part IV outlines a more effective
analysis of drones under the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test
by analyzing the specific facts that might express a surveilled person’s
subjective expectation of privacy, the scope of those expressive
factors, and whether the information obtained through surveillance
was exposed to the plain view of the public. This reemphasized and
expanded analysis would likely solve many of the problems presented
by the application of current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to
drones.
I. DRONES AND CURRENT FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
Under the Fourth Amendment, “[t]he right of people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
34
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” The
Fourth Amendment is the “chief source of privacy protection” in the
35
American justice system. It is intended to empower the government
to investigate and enforce laws to a “reasonably satisfactory level,”
36
while still restricting these powers. In doing so, it acts as a “bulwark

32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
RONALD JAY ALLEN, WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, JOSEPH L. HOFFMAN, DEBRA A.
LIVINGSTON & ANDREW D. LEIBOLD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATION AND RIGHT
TO COUNSEL 337 (2011).
36. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125
HARV. L. REV. 476, 484 (2011).
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against police practices that prevail in totalitarian regimes.” Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence has therefore sought an appropriate
balance between the government’s investigative and prosecutorial
powers and an individual’s constitutional rights.
In applying the Fourth Amendment to drones, a court must
undertake several relevant inquiries to determine if the government’s
use of the drone violates the Fourth Amendment. The court must first
determine whether a search for Fourth Amendment purposes
38
occurred. If no search transpired, then the Fourth Amendment is not
39
implicated. Second, if a search occurred for which no warrant was
40
issued, the court must consider whether that search was reasonable.
Therefore, when analyzing the government’s use of drones for
domestic surveillance, an issue not yet ruled on by the Supreme
Court, the first—and, under current jurisprudence, the most
relevant—inquiry is whether this surveillance constitutes a search.
This fundamental question plays a significant role in existing Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, and any potentially successful challenge
to domestic drone surveillance must first satisfy this inquiry. The issue
of whether a search occurred, in addition to whether that search was
reasonable, has perplexed courts since the Fourth Amendment’s
41
ratification. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been heavily
42
criticized by numerous legal scholars and labeled “a mess,” “a
43
theoretical embarrassment,” and “a vast jumble of judicial
pronouncements that is not merely complex and contradictory, but
44
often perverse.”

37. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 586 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38. JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES,
POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES 82 (1999).
39. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 35, at 418.
40. DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 38, at 62, 334.
41. See Kerr, supra note 36, at 480 (“Fourth Amendment rules can appear to be selected
almost at random. The patchwork of results has made search and seizure law a theoretical
embarrassment to scholars and judges alike. According to scholars, the law lacks any theoretical
grounding. It is cobbled together from ‘a series of inconsistent and bizarre results that [the
Court] has left entirely undefended.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); see also Kyllo
v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (“[T]he antecedent question whether or not a Fourth
Amendment ‘search’ has occurred is not so simple under our precedent.”).
42. Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits of
Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1149, 1149 (1998).
43. Kerr, supra note 36, at 480.
44. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 758
(1994).
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Through the doctrine’s “patchwork of [Fourth Amendment]
45
protections,” two frameworks have arisen for identifying a search: a
46
property-rights paradigm and a privacy-rights paradigm. The
traditional property-rights paradigm focuses on common-law
property rights and examines the government’s conduct under the
“trespass,” “curtilage,” and “open-fields” doctrines. Beginning in the
twentieth century, courts also adopted a paradigm that focuses on a
person’s expectations of privacy and analyzes whether these
expectations are both subjectively held and objectively reasonable.
These two paradigms recognize the intertwined property and privacy
principles inherent in the Fourth Amendment’s guarantees from
47
unreasonable searches and seizures.
A. The Property-Rights Paradigm
The property-rights framework uses common-law property rights
as the parameters for identifying a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. This approach arose from historical roots in the
48
common law and society’s reverence for individual property rights.
This paradigm also reflects a simple and transparent doctrinal
solution to unreasonable governmental intrusions limited by pretwentieth century investigatory mechanisms that relied on the natural
49
senses. Such searches typically required a physical trespass to
50
acquire the information sought by the government.
51
United States v. Jones provides a modern example of the
property-rights paradigm under the trespass doctrine. In Jones, the
Supreme Court considered whether attaching a Global Positioning
45. Kerr, supra note 36, at 479.
46. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012) (“[T]he Katz reasonableexpectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory
test.”).
47. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1419 (2013) (Kagan, J., concurring) (describing
the connection between property and privacy within the Fourth Amendment).
48. Entick v. Carrington, [1765] 95 Eng. Rep. (K.B.) [817] (“Our law holds the property of
every man so sacred that no man can set his foot upon his neighbour’s close without his leave. If
he does he is a trespasser, though he does no damage at all.”). Courts and legal scholars have
long considered Carrington as “‘the true and ultimate expression of constitutional law’ with
regard to search and seizure” and “‘undoubtedly familiar’ to ‘every American statesman’ at the
time the Constitution was adopted.” Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 (quoting Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo,
489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989)).
49. See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417 (“One virtue of the Fourth Amendment’s propertyrights baseline is that it keeps easy cases easy.”).
50. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950.
51. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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System (GPS) to Antoine Jones’s vehicle and monitoring his
movements on public roads for twenty-eight days without a warrant
52
constituted an unreasonable search. The Court unanimously found
that the government’s conduct violated the Fourth Amendment, but
53
the justices split over their reasoning for that holding. The majority
opinion, written by Justice Antonin Scalia, held that the government’s
actions violated Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights based upon the
54
trespass doctrine. By physically attaching a GPS to Jones’s vehicle,
the government committed a trespass upon chattel and “encroached
on a [constitutionally] protected area,” notwithstanding the
government’s monitoring of the vehicle’s movements on public
55
roads.
The government’s actions therefore constituted an
56
unreasonable search.
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has extended this propertyrights paradigm to the curtilage doctrine. The curtilage of the home is
considered as “part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment
57
purposes” and, thus, afforded the same protections. The curtilage
consists of the area immediately surrounding a home where the
58
private details of the home naturally extend, and it is “intimately
59
linked to the home, both physically and psychologically.” In
determining whether an area forms the curtilage, courts have
considered a variety of factors, including “the proximity of the
area . . . to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure
surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put,

52. Id. at 948.
53. Id. at 947. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Sotomayor joined
Justice Scalia’s opinion holding that the government’s conduct constituted a search under the
property-rights paradigm. Id. at 947, 949. Justice Sotomayor entered a concurring opinion
arguing that the government’s conduct constituted a search under both the property- and
privacy-rights paradigms. Id. at 954–55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). And Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Kagan joined Justice Alito’s concurring opinion arguing that the government’s
conduct constituted a search under the privacy-rights paradigm. Id. at 964 (Alito, J.,
concurring).
54. Id. at 949.
55. Id. at 952.
56. Id. at 949.
57. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).
58. See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414–15 (2013) (finding that the front
porch of a home fell within the curtilage); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986)
(finding that a “fenced-in backyard” fell within the curtilage). But see Dow Chem. Co. v. United
States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (finding that “the open areas of an industrial plant complex . . .
spread over an area of 2,000 acres” did not fall within the curtilage).
59. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213.
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and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from
60
observation by people passing by.” The curtilage is generally easily
identifiable and understandable from our common experiences and
61
knowledge. The Supreme Court has found the curtilage to include,
62
among other areas, a front porch to a home and a “fenced-in
63
backyard.” The curtilage does not include, however, “the open areas
of an industrial plant complex . . . spread over an area of 2,000
64
acres.”
65
In Florida v. Jardines, a 2013 property-rights case, the Supreme
Court discussed the Fourth Amendment protections guaranteed to
the curtilage as well as the scope of an implicit license to enter the
curtilage for certain purposes. Here, the Court considered whether
the government’s brief physical presence on Joelis Jardines’s front
porch with a drug-sniffing dog, to investigate if illicit drugs were
66
inside the home, constituted an unreasonable search. The majority
held that by entering the curtilage (here, the front porch) and acting
beyond an implicit license to approach a home and solicit its
occupants (here, using the drug-sniffing dog), the government
physically trespassed on a constitutionally protected area and, thus,
67
violated Jardines’s Fourth Amendment rights. According to the
68
Court, the type of investigative instrument utilized, the duration of
69
the trespass, and the fact that any law-enforcement officer or citizen
could enter the same area to knock on the door and attempt to
70
contact the home’s occupants, were all irrelevant.
By contrast, courts have not extended the same guarantees
afforded to the home and its curtilage to areas deemed analogous to
71
an open field. Open fields are not required to be either open or
fields in the literal sense, but they typically fall outside of the home’s
60. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987).
61. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 n.12.
62. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414.
63. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209.
64. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986).
65. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
66. Id. at 1413.
67. Id. at 1417–18.
68. Id. at 1417.
69. See id. at 1421 (Alito, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion for ignoring the
short period of time, approximately one or two minutes, during which the events transpired).
70. Id. at 1416 (majority opinion).
71. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235–36 (1986); Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170, 176 (1984).
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72

Accordingly, an absence or insufficiency of the
curtilage.
enumerated factors establishing the curtilage of a home would denote
73
an open field. The Court has found, for example, that a barn was
located in an open field, rather than the curtilage, because the barn
was fifty yards from a fence surrounding the home and sixty yards
from the home, the barn was not surrounded by a fence, the barn
“was not being used for intimate activities of the home,” and the
resident of the home “did little to protect the barn area from
74
observation by those standing in open fields.” Open fields do not
share the same setting for private activities and information that the
75
Fourth Amendment protects from governmental intrusions. Thus, a
person may not expect privacy in an open field, and the government’s
76
conduct generally would not constitute a search.
77
In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court
considered whether the curtilage or open-fields doctrine applied to
78
the open areas between buildings on a large industrial property. The
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) conducted
warrantless, aerial surveillance of a two-thousand-acre facility owned
79
by Dow Chemical. Finding that the extensive, scattered outdoor
areas of the complex were neither precisely the curtilage nor an open
80
field, the Court concluded that the complex was more similar to an
81
open field. Therefore, the Fourth Amendment’s guarantees did not
extend to these areas, and the government’s actions did not constitute
82
a search.
The Supreme Court has recently adapted this property-rights
paradigm to investigations of the home that would traditionally fall

72. Dow, 476 U.S. at 236, 239 (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 n.11); see also, e.g., United
States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 304 (1987).
73. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 221 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) (listing the
factors relevant to determining whether an area constitutes the curtilage); Oliver, 466 U.S. at
171 (“[T]he common law, by implying that only the land immediately surrounding and
associated with the home warrants the Fourth Amendment protections that attach to the home,
conversely implies that no expectation of privacy legitimately attaches to open fields.”).
74. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 302–03.
75. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179.
76. Id. at 178.
77. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
78. Id. at 235.
79. Id. at 229.
80. Id. at 236.
81. Id. at 239.
82. Id.
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outside the trespass doctrine because they do not complete a
traditional, physical trespass. This adaptation, expounded in Kyllo v.
83
United States, has extended the property-rights paradigm to certain
invasive technologies in order to shelter the Fourth Amendment’s
84
guarantees from modern technology. This paradigm will likely play a
critical role in evaluating the constitutionality of many sophisticated
technologies employed by drones. In Kyllo, a federal agent,
investigating whether Danny Kyllo was growing marijuana plants
using heat lamps inside his home, used a thermal-imaging device from
a public roadway to determine if there was an elevated amount of
85
heat emanating from the walls of the home. The Supreme Court
considered whether the government’s use of the thermal imager
constituted an unreasonable search and, more generally, “what limits
there are upon [the] power of technology to shrink the realm of
86
guaranteed privacy.” The majority held that when the government
uses sense-enhancing technology to acquire details from within “the
home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical
‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’” then this conduct
constitutes an unreasonable search when the technology “is not in
87
general public use.”
Although the Court failed to clarify the parameters of general
public use, several earlier cases introducing this requirement seemed
88
to require only marginal use or prevalence. For example, in Florida
89
v. Riley, the Supreme Court found that helicopter travel was not
“unheard of” in the area and that it was not “sufficiently rare” to
90
raise a Fourth Amendment issue. In Dow, the Court found a twenty91
two-thousand-dollar mapmaking camera to be “conventional.” The
scope of this general-use element is especially relevant to the
impending boom in drone usage and the forthcoming Federal
83. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
84. Id. at 34 (stating that the rule in Kyllo “assures preservation of that degree of privacy
against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted”); id. at 36 (“[T]he
rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in
development.”).
85. Id. at 29.
86. Id. at 34.
87. Id. at 34 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
88. The Court did note, however, that the thermal imager was “relatively crude” and not in
general public use. Id. at 34, 36.
89. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (plurality opinion).
90. Id. at 450–51.
91. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986).
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Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations under the FAA
92
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (FAA Modernization Act),
93
which will integrate drones into the national airspace.
B. The Privacy-Rights Paradigm
Beginning in the twentieth century, the Supreme Court adopted
a new Fourth Amendment doctrine analyzing certain nontrespassory
issues under privacy-rights rationales. In recognizing that “the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places,” the Court attempted to
guide the doctrine’s analytical criterion to maintain the Fourth
94
Amendment’s guarantees in the face of modern technology. This
privacy-rights approach resulted from the Court’s recognition of
various technological advancements that no longer fell neatly within
95
the property-rights jurisprudence. These new technologies have
enabled the government to acquire the same type of information—as
well as entirely new types of information—that traditionally could
only have been lawfully collected by the government pursuant to a
96
warrant.
The Court first announced the privacy-rights paradigm in Katz v.
United States. In Katz, the government attached a microphone to a
public phone booth to listen to and record Charles Katz’s telephone
97
conversations. The Court rejected the argument that a Fourth
Amendment violation turned on whether a physical trespass had
98
occurred. Instead, it held that the government had violated Katz’s
reasonable expectation of privacy by listening to his conversation,
92. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 332(a)(3), 126 Stat.
11, 73 (2012).
93. Id.
94. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
95. See id. at 353 (holding that the government’s conduct violated Katz’s privacy rights
under the Fourth Amendment and reasoning that “[t]he fact that the electronic device . . . did
not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance”).
96. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 132 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014) (“Indeed, a cell phone search
would typically expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house:
A phone not only contains in digital form many sensitive records previously found in the home;
it also contains a broad array of private information never found in a home in any form . . . .”);
id. at 2494–95 (“Modern cell phones are not just another technological convenience. With all
they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans ‘the privacies of life.’”
(citation omitted)); id. at 2496 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Many cell phones now in use are capable
of storing and accessing a quantity of information, some highly personal, that no person would
ever have had on his person in hard-copy form.”).
97. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
98. Id. at 353.
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which was intended to be private once he closed the phone-booth
99
The government’s actions therefore constituted an
door.
100
unreasonable search. In so holding, the Court reasoned that “[w]hat
a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
101
protected.”
Although the majority opinion diverged from the traditional
inquiry regarding property rights as the sole relevant criterion in
102
identifying a Fourth Amendment search, Katz’s prominence in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence comes from Justice John Harlan’s
103
concurring opinion. Justice Harlan interpreted the majority opinion
as holding, in part, that “electronic as well as physical intrusion” into
areas where “a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable
expectation of privacy” can violate the Fourth Amendment, and that
“the invasion of a constitutionally protected area by [the government]
is . . . presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a search
104
warrant.” In finding an invasion of Katz’s reasonable expectation of
privacy, Justice Harlan established a two-part test for determining
105
whether such an expectation existed. First, a person must “have
106
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy.” Second,
that subjective expectation must “be one that society is prepared to
107
recognize as [objectively] ‘reasonable.’”
In the decades following Katz and the reasonable-expectation-ofprivacy test, the Court confronted the issue of warrantless, aerial
108
surveillance in three key cases. Although each of the cases
considered aerial surveillance in some respect, they all added a
different dynamic to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the

99. Id. at 352.
100. Id. at 353.
101. Id. at 351–52 (citations omitted).
102. Id. at 353.
103. The Court subsequently adopted the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test in Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
104. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 361.
107. Id.
108. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (plurality opinion); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207 (1986); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
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reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test. And each case informs the
approach to drones.
109
California v. Ciraolo, the first of the aerial-surveillance triad,
addressed the constitutionality of warrantless, “naked-eye
110
observation” of the curtilage of a home from above. To investigate
an anonymous tip that Ciraolo was growing marijuana in his
backyard, police officers flew an airplane over his property,
photographing marijuana plants discovered on the property from
111
one-thousand feet above. The Court held that although Ciraolo
“manifest[ed] his own subjective intent and desire to maintain
112
privacy” by putting up a fence, his expectation was not one that
113
society was prepared to recognize as reasonable. The majority
reasoned that because of the proliferation of air travel, anyone could
look down and observe the curtilage of Ciraolo’s home with naked114
eye observation. The Fourth Amendment does not hold the police
to a higher standard and require them “to shield their eyes when
passing by a home on public thoroughfares . . . where [they have] a
115
right to be.”
Dow, discussed above, also considered the “narrow issue” of
whether nontrespassory, aerial surveillance of a large commercial
116
property constituted a Fourth Amendment violation. In Dow, the
EPA surveilled a two-thousand-acre commercial complex from
117
altitudes of twelve-hundred feet and above. The aircraft used “a
conventional, albeit precise, commercial camera commonly used in
118
mapmaking” that cost over twenty-two-thousand dollars in the
1980s and was able to enlarge photographs taken at twelve-hundred
feet to identify something as small as a power line about one-half of
119
an inch in diameter. Although the majority opinion focused most of

109. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
110. Id. at 213.
111. Id. at 209.
112. Id. at 211. Although it referenced Ciraolo’s subjective expectation of privacy, the Court
neglected to determine the subjective requirement because the state had waived this issue on
appeal. Id.
113. Id. at 214.
114. Id. at 215.
115. Id. at 213.
116. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237 (1986).
117. Id. at 229.
118. Id. at 238.
119. Id. at 242 n.4, 243 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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120

its analysis on the open-fields doctrine and the facts of Ciraolo,
121
which had been decided on the same day as Dow, it also cited the
reduced expectations of privacy in commercial properties and the
type of technology utilized by the government as relevant to its
122
inquiry. The Court reasoned that because expectations of privacy in
commercial properties are lesser than those in a home, the Fourth
Amendment does not extend to commercial properties as it does to
123
the home. The majority opinion also suggested that the use of
“highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available
124
to the public” might constitute an unreasonable search. The
technology used by the EPA, however, was not so sophisticated and
125
revealing as to constitute an unreasonable search.
126
The third and final case, Florida v. Riley, was decided three
years after Ciraolo and Dow and garnered only a plurality vote of the
127
Court. In Florida v. Riley, the Supreme Court considered whether
warrantless, naked-eye aerial observation of the interior of a partially
128
enclosed greenhouse violated the Fourth Amendment.
Police
officers, investigating an anonymous tip, flew a helicopter fourhundred feet over Riley’s greenhouse, which was located ten to
129
twenty feet from his home. Because sections of the greenhouse roof
were missing, the officers were able to see inside the greenhouse and
130
identify marijuana plants through naked-eye observation.
Although finding that the greenhouse was within the curtilage,
the Court held that the government’s conduct did not constitute a
131
search for Fourth Amendment purposes. The plurality opinion
reasoned that because the interior of the greenhouse was visible from
above through the missing roof panels, Riley could not reasonably
expect this area to be free from lawful observations from the public

120. Id. at 234–39 (majority opinion).
121. Both cases were decided on May 19, 1986, and Chief Justice Warren Burger authored
both majority opinions. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 207 (1986); Dow, 476 U.S. at 227.
122. Dow, 476 U.S. at 237–39.
123. Id. at 237–38 (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598–99 (1981)).
124. Id. at 238.
125. Id.
126. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (plurality opinion).
127. Id. at 445–47.
128. Id. at 447–48.
129. Id. at 448.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 450, 452.
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132

airspace. Moreover, the Court emphasized that the government’s
actions did not violate any laws or regulations and that there was no
indication that similar helicopter flights were sufficiently rare in the
United States to support a reasonable expectation of privacy from
133
this type of observation.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF DRONE TECHNOLOGY
Although drones have received more public attention recently,
they have already played a significant role in both U.S. and world
history. Recent events—and federal legislation—indicate that this
trend is likely to continue. The current market for drones is at an alltime high, and public and private demand for drones continues to
134
grow. Continuing development of sophisticated drone technology,
135
in addition to decreasing costs, will further increase this demand.
A. The Current Market for Drone Technology
Earlier prototypes of drones were much different than those in
the news today, and the use of drones has expanded since their
136
creation. A predecessor to the drone first appeared in American
military history during the American Civil War, when both Union
and Rebel forces deployed balloons filled with explosive devices
137
against each other. During World War I, the U.S. Navy tested and
developed “aerial torpedoes,” a form of remote-controlled, explosive
drones that would be flown into targets, including “German U-boats,
their bases, and munitions factories[,] from distances of up to 100
138
miles.” Although these aerial torpedoes were not sufficiently
139
accurate to be used during World War I, they were eventually flown
140
in World War II. And during the Vietnam War, the U.S. military
used drones for surveillance, intelligence gathering, “leaflet
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 450.
Id. at 451–52.
See infra notes 154–55 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.B; notes 150–53 and accompanying text.
See generally LAURENCE R. NEWCOME, UNMANNED AVIATION: A BRIEF HISTORY OF
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (2004); ZALOGA, supra note 5.
137. Jim Garamone, From U.S. Civil War to Afghanistan: A Short History of UAVs, U.S.
DEP’T OF DEFENSE (Apr. 16, 2002), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=44164.
These exploding balloons were supposedly not “terribly effective.” Id.
138. NEWCOME, supra note 136, at 18.
139. ZALOGA, supra note 5, at 6.
140. Garamone, supra note 137.
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dropping,” and “radar detection, location[,] and identification” of
141
surface-to-air missiles. Drones are now frequently used to surveil
142
and to conduct air strikes on terrorists and terrorist organizations.
Today, drones have evolved from their militaristic roots and are
143
used for a variety of purposes. As of 2014, drones have been used to
144
145
monitor weather patterns, to assist in farming and ranching, to
146
patrol international borders,
to map and photograph remote
147
locations, to conduct search and rescue missions after the 2010
earthquake in Haiti, and to survey damage after the 2011 Fukushima
148
nuclear disaster. And the predicted applications for drones seem
limitless. Some drone advocates have projected their use for
engineering, firefighting, journalism, preventing animal poaching, and
149
even delivering packages and pizza.
In addition to their sophisticated capabilities and expanding
applications, the ever-decreasing cost of drones is further propelling
their popularity. Although some drones like the Air Force’s RQ150
4A/B Global Hawk cost as much as $222.7 million, companies are
developing far-less-expensive models—like Apple’s Parrot AR.Drone
151
2.0—that cost as little as a few hundred dollars. In the lawenforcement setting, the retail price for a police helicopter commonly
used for ground support or search-and-rescue missions (not including
expenses for fuel, maintenance, and manpower) generally exceeds
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., ZALOGA, supra note 5, at 4 (describing a Central Intelligence Agency drone
attack on a senior Al Qaeda leader).
143. Daisy Carrington & Jenny Soffel, 15 Ways Drones Will Change Your Life, CNN (Nov.
18,
2013,
5:23
AM),
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/03/business/meet-your-friendlyneighborhood-drones.
144. Jason Koebler, NASA to Use Second Drone to Monitor Hurricanes, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (May 30, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/05/30/nasa-to-usesecond-drone-to-monitor-hurricanes.
145. Carrington & Soffel, supra note 143.
146. William Booth, More Predator Drones Fly U.S.-Mexico Border, WASH. POST, Dec. 21,
2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/more-predator-drones-fly-us-mexico-border/2011/
12/01/gIQANSZz8O_story.html.
147. Jason Koebler, Drones Could be Coming to American Skies Sooner Than You Think,
POLITICO MAG. (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/01/drones-faalawsuit-coming-to-american-skies-102754.html#.UvbYJXk2_wI.
148. Jonathan Beale, Drones: A Rare Glimpse at Sophisticated US Spy Plane, BBC NEWS
(Oct. 30, 2013, 8:37 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-24729998.
149. Koebler, supra note 147.
150. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-294SP, DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS:
ASSESSMENTS OF SELECTED WEAPON PROGRAMS 113 (2013).
151. Thompson, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 28, at 16.
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152

one-million dollars. These high costs have prevented many law153
enforcement departments from purchasing helicopters. Drones
provide an inexpensive alternative with many of the same—and often
greater—capabilities.
In light of these diverse applications, American venture
capitalists invested over forty-million dollars in drones during the first
154
nine months of 2013, over twice the total amount in all of 2012, and
the total global market for drones was estimated to have hit eighty155
nine billion dollars by 2013. Although FAA regulations have
156
somewhat hindered the proliferation of drone usage, this bulwark
will soon be removed by pending FAA regulations that will govern
federal aviation law. The FAA Modernization Act directs the FAA to
develop a plan to safely integrate drones into the national airspace no
157
later than September 30, 2015. The inevitable result of these
measures will be a rapid and heavy influx of drone usage in the
158
United States. In fact, the FAA has forecast that nonmilitary
persons will operate approximately fifteen-thousand drones by 2020
159
and thirty-thousand drones by 2030.
These advanced and affordable technologies have attracted
many public entities at both the federal and local level. As of
November 2013, the FAA had granted 1387 licenses to fly drones,
160
only one of which was issued to a private entity. The U.S. Customs
152. Peter Finn, Privacy Issues Hover Over Police Drone Use, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/privacy-issues-hover-over-police-drone-use/2011/
01/22/ABEw0uD_story.html.
153. Id.
154. Olga Kharif, As Drones Evolve from Military to Civilian Uses, Venture Capitalists Move
In, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/as-drones-evolve-frommilitary-to-civilian-uses-venture-capitalists-move-in/2013/10/31/592ca862-419e-11e3-8b74d89d714ca4dd_story.html.
155. Carrington & Soffel, supra note 143.
156. Kharif, supra note 154.
157. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 332(a)(3), 126 Stat.
11, 73 (2012). But see Pegues, supra note 26 (“[I]t is nearly certain that the FAA will not meet
[the September 2015] deadline. Instead, 2017 seems to be a more realistic time frame.”).
158. See Koebler, supra note 147 (describing the legal limitations on companies selling
drones in the United States, and American companies who resort to selling drones abroad in
response).
159. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, FAA AEROSPACE FORECAST: FISCAL YEARS
2010-2030,
at
48
(2010),
available
at
http://www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/
aerospace_forecasts/2010-2030/media/2010%20Forecast%20Doc.pdf.
160. Koebler, supra note 147. The sole private entity was the oil company ConocoPhillips.
Id. The FAA has also granted six aerial-photography and video-production companies
regulatory exemptions, allowing them to fly drones without a license. Press Release, Fed.
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and Border Protection (CBP) has flown drones along the U.S.–
161
Mexico border since 2004 to assist its agents. Drones have made
their way into the ranks of local law enforcement as well. Several
noteworthy law-enforcement departments that have used drone
technology include the Houston Police Department, the Miami-Dade
Police Department, the Seattle Police Department, and the Federal
162
Bureau of Investigations. According to law-enforcement officials,
drones are a “tactical game-changer,” and “‘[n]ot since the Taser has
163
a technology promised so much for law enforcement.’” One lawenforcement agency, the Georgia Tech Police Department (GTPD),
even applied for FAA authorization to fly drones for “special events”
164
and “day-to-day law enforcement operations.” Although GTPD’s
application was ultimately denied, the department planned to deploy
drones to the locations of reported situations and emergencies, and
the project was “intended . . . [to] provide valuable lessons learned for
165
the use of [drones] for law enforcement nationwide.”
B. Current Drone Capabilities
Most of the successes of drones are attributable to their
sophisticated technologies and capabilities. Drones are equipped with
various technologies for visual surveillance, audio enhancement, and
sense-enhancing capabilities, and with sophisticated programming.
Drones are manufactured in a variety of sizes, weights, and designs,
and with various methods of flight and propulsion. Current models
166
range in size from a wingspan of just three centimeters to over forty
167
168
meters. Drones range in weight from eighty milligrams to nearly
Aviation Admin., U.S. Transportation Secretary Foxx Announces FAA Exemptions for
Commercial UAS Movie and TV Production (Sept. 25, 2014).
161. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Support Border Security, CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT.
TODAY (U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Washington, D.C.), July–Aug. 2004, available at
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2004/Aug/other/aerial_vehicles.xml.
162. 2011–2012 FAA List of Drone License Applicants, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/document/2012-faa-list-drone-applicants (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
163. Finn, supra note 152.
164. Georgia Tech Police Department Drone Records, Certificate of Authorization, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/document/georgia-tech-police-dept (last visited Feb. 8,
2015).
165. Id.
166. Amina Khan, Meet RoboBee, a Bug-sized, Bio-inspired Flying Robot, L.A. TIMES (May
2, 2013, 5:11 PM), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/02/science/la-sci-sn-flying-robot-robobeesmallest-ever-20130502.
167. Global Hawk, NORTHROP GRUMMAN, http://www.northropgrumman.com/capabilities/
globalhawk/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
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169

Although many drones have been designed as
seven tons.
traditional fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, there have been significant
developments to the aeronautical design and propulsion of drones
enabling them to fly by “flap[ping their] wings,” similar to birds and
170
insects.
The SolarEagle and the RoboBee are perhaps two of the best
examples that demonstrate the spectrum of advanced drone designs
that could be used by law enforcement. The SolarEagle, currently in
development by Boeing and the U.S. Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA), is projected to have a wingspan of
approximately 120 meters and will utilize solar energy as its power
171
source.
In comparison, the RoboBee has a wingspan of
approximately three centimeters, weighs eighty milligrams, and was
inspired by the bee, contributing to its design and propulsion by two
172
insect-like wings that flap 120 times per second. Drones also have
reached significant milestones with regard to velocity, altitude, and
flight time. Current models are capable of reaching speeds of over 310
173
knots true airspeed and altitudes of over 60,000 feet.
The
SolarEagle’s use of solar energy is projected to enable it to remain in
continuous flight, without recharging or refueling, for over five
174
years.
Drones also employ the most advanced technology available for
visual surveillance. One such example is DARPA’s Autonomous
Real-Time Ground Ubiquitous Surveillance Imaging System
175
(ARGUS). Alleged to be the most sophisticated surveillance
technology ever created—and still partially classified—ARGUS can
record video footage with 1.8-gigapixel resolution of an area covering
176
fifteen square miles from a drone flying at twenty-thousand feet.
The recording automatically tracks all moving objects within the area

168. Khan, supra note 166.
169. Global Hawk, supra note 167.
170. Khan, supra note 166.
171. Boeing Wins DARPA Vulture II Program, BOEING (Sept. 16, 2010),
http://boeing.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=20295&item=1425.
172. Khan, supra note 166.
173. Global Hawk, supra note 167.
174. Boeing Wins DARPA Vulture II Program, supra note 171.
175. Craig Lloyd, DARPA Unveils 1.8-Gigapixel Drone Camera, Can Target Hostiles at
20,000 Feet, SLASHGEAR (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.slashgear.com/darpa-unveils-1-8-gigapixeldrone-camera-can-target-hostiles-at-20000-feet-29267138.
176. Id.
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and can magnify objects on the ground as small as six inches.
ARGUS can monitor a medium-sized city and record over five178
thousand hours of footage per day. Existing drone technology can
179
180
also recognize and record license plates and faces. Other forms of
visual-surveillance technology include the ability to see through
obstructions such as clouds, fog, and walls; to identify objects at
181
night; and, possibly, to recognize psychological signals that detect
182
impending violent behaviors.
Drones are able to employ different types of sense-enhancing
technology, including audio recorders and “sniffers” that detect
183
biological, chemical, radioactive, and explosive agents in the air. For
example, Makel Engineering, Inc. and Pennsylvania State University
are currently developing a drone for the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast
Guard that weighs less than one pound and that could be deployed to
suspicious vessels to sniff for explosives, chemical and biological
184
weapons, and illicit drugs.
Future drone technology may be even less restricted by the need
for human pilots at the controls. Drones can already fly
185
autonomously, or without any human control. Some have expanded
on this technology by programming drones to fly in coordinated,

177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Cf. Eric Roper, City Cameras Track Anyone, Even Minneapolis Mayor Rybak, STAR
TRIB. (Aug. 17, 2012, 1:13 PM), http://www.startribune.com/local/minneapolis/166494646.html
(describing a Minneapolis municipal database that stores data regarding the recent location of
personal vehicles based on license-plate photographs taken by high-definition cameras
throughout the city).
180. Brian Naylor, Look, Up in the Sky! It’s a Drone, Looking at You, NPR (Dec. 5, 2011,
12:34
PM),
http://www.npr.org/2011/12/05/143144146/drone-technology-finding-its-way-toamerican-skies.
181. UNIV. OF WASH. TECH. & PUB. POL’Y CLINIC, DOMESTIC DRONES: TECH. AND POL’Y
ISSUES, at 6 (2013), available at http://www.law.washington.edu/Clinics/Technology/
Reports/DronesLawandPolicy.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
182. Detection and Computational Analysis of Psychological Signals (DCAPS), DARPA,
http://www.darpa.mil/Our_Work/I2O/Programs/Detection_and_Computational_Analysis_of_Ps
ychological_Signals_(DCAPS).aspx (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
183. MAKEL ENG’G, INC., COMPACT ELEC. SNIFFER FOR SHIPBOARD LAUNCHED UAV
CBRNE DETECTION MISSIONS, at 1, available at http://files.meetup.com/1275333/
Narcotic%20sniffing%20drone.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2015).
184. Id.
185. ZALOGA, supra note 5; see also Audwin Short, Nano Quadcopter Robots Swarm Video
Flying Drones, YOUTUBE (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AiCFtmdrvHM
(showing multiple drones flying in formation autonomously).
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strategic formations with other drones. These coordinated drones
can fly in organized columns and rows, in intersecting figure-eight
patterns, and through physical obstructions such as windows and
187
doors, along both horizontal and vertical axes.
A critical feature of these designs and capabilities is that these
drones may be undetectable to the person or persons observed.
Whether it is from thousands of feet away using precise, senseenhancing technology or mere inches away in an insect-like form,
these drones have the capability to conduct surveillance without
detection.
Although these current features and prototypes provide
tangible—and intriguing—examples of drone technology, they are
intended to serve solely as models to analyze under the Fourth
Amendment. Importantly, these are only the current designs and
capabilities of drones, and these models will likely be outdated,
possibly even irrelevant, by the time the courts address drone
surveillance under the Fourth Amendment.
III. THE DOCTRINAL FAILINGS OF CURRENT FOURTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN APPLIED TO DRONES
There are several problems with applying current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence to drones. The factual dynamics of Fourth
Amendment cases contribute to the mishmash of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, and the increased complexity of drone technology will
only contribute to the problems with applying either Fourth
Amendment search paradigm to drones. First, drones could generally
avoid all Fourth Amendment violations under the property-rights
paradigm because they can fly on public thoroughfares, thereby
avoiding a trespass. Second, although the reasonable-expectation-ofprivacy test would provide the most workable test for an analysis of
drones, a person would often be unable to satisfy the test’s subjective
element, and courts have not yet expounded an understandable
theory for the objective element. Drones therefore face considerable
challenges under the current jurisprudence.

186. Short, supra note 185.
187. Id.
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A. Factual Dynamics of Fourth Amendment Cases
Given its highly context-specific application, a significant feature
of the Fourth Amendment is the dynamic factual scenarios that are
188
presented for court review. The government often employs new
189
instruments to investigate and prosecute criminals.
Likewise,
criminals often employ new instruments to commit crimes and to
190
evade police detection or capture. Ordinary citizens, however, may
employ many of these same instruments to accommodate their
everyday conveniences and necessities. According to Professor Orin
Kerr, this complex dynamic has contributed to the numerous
exceptions and seemingly divergent holdings of Fourth Amendment
191
precedent. This dynamic is exacerbated by the diverse designs and
capabilities of sophisticated technology—a dynamic that is not
alleviated by drone technology.
Law enforcement can strategically use drone technology to avoid
current Fourth Amendment prohibitions. The government can
navigate the various doctrinal loopholes by altering the designs and
capabilities of drones, the location and flight paths of drones, the
means of acquiring information, and the types of information
acquired. In effect, drones implicate the most factually diverse aspects
of an already diverse and unpredictable jurisprudence. Analyzing
drones under both the property-rights and privacy-rights paradigms
thus presents significant problems for determining when the use of
drones constitutes an unreasonable search.
B. Property-Rights Analysis of Drones
Although some narrow instances might raise a Fourth
Amendment issue, drones generally would not be hampered under
the property-rights paradigm. It is long established that an aircraft
192
traveling over an individual’s land does not constitute a trespass.
The Supreme Court rejected the common-law concept of cuius est
solum, eius est usque ad coelum—extending a property owner’s rights

188. Kerr, supra note 36, at 485.
189. Id. at 486.
190. Id.
191. See id. at 487–90 (arguing that judges recognize the factual dynamics and power
imbalances resulting from these technologies and attempt to reconcile these dynamics by
applying the law in ways to restore the balance of power between the police and society—what
Kerr calls the “Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory”).
192. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260–61 (1946).
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to the center of the earth and the infinite limits of the universe—as a
193
doctrine with “no place in the modern world.” In discarding this
doctrine, the Court recognized that the “immediate reaches” around
194
property still belong to the owner. These “immediate reaches,”
however, seem to comprise the literal interpretation of the phrase, as
the Supreme Court has concluded that even low-flying aircraft do not
enter these reaches. In Florida v. Riley, for example, the plurality
opinion held that a helicopter flying four-hundred feet over Riley’s
property did not constitute a trespass in violation of the Fourth
195
Amendment. The plurality opinion did acknowledge, however, that
these limits still exist and that not every aerial inspection of a home
would survive an inquiry under the Fourth Amendment “simply
because the [aircraft] is within the navigable airspace specified by
196
law.”
Much of the current use of drones would not constitute a Fourth
Amendment violation under the trespass doctrine. Drones are
analogous to manned aircraft in many respects because they can fly
on the same public thoroughfares abutting private property. The
same precedent regarding air travel would therefore control. If that
were the case, drones’ flight paths—at or above the four-hundred feet
in Florida v. Riley—would not constitute a trespass for Fourth
Amendment purposes. As discussed above, drones have the ability to
fly a few inches off the ground and at altitudes of up to sixty-five197
thousand feet. Drones flying at lower altitudes could risk a Fourth
Amendment violation under the trespass doctrine for being within
the immediate reaches of the property. Assuming that they do not fly
within these immediate reaches at ground-level altitudes or near
taller buildings (for example, outside the window of a high-rise
apartment), however, drones would evade trespass violations as other
aircraft do. If the government wanted to conduct surveillance, it could
also utilize conventional and future methods of surveillance from
public areas or from lower levels that would not implicate the trespass
doctrine.
The curtilage doctrine also does not provide a significant Fourth
Amendment impediment to law enforcement’s use of drones. If

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id.
Id. at 264.
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989) (plurality opinion).
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 173.
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drones fly outside the immediate reaches of property, then they are
likely to avoid a trespass within the curtilage. Furthermore, observing
details within the curtilage of the home from a lawful location would
not constitute an unreasonable search, as government actors are not
required “to shield their eyes” from observing the home or its
198
curtilage. A Jardines-like scenario might be the exception, but it sets
some precedent for the proposition that certain uses of drones to
observe the inside of a home constitute a search within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. If the government entered the curtilage
199
with a drone to obtain information, similar to Jardines, then the
trespass doctrine would prohibit conduct outside of an express or
implied license to enter the curtilage. It is highly improbable,
however, that drones would have an express or implied license to
enter the curtilage to investigate.
Lastly, the open-fields doctrine provides no greater protection
from drones. The Supreme Court has already rejected the idea that
200
the Fourth Amendment applies to open fields. Therefore, the
government’s use of a drone to obtain information in open fields
would not constitute a search for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment.
Despite the advanced capabilities and high costs of some drone
models, many would fall outside of the Fourth Amendment analysis
stated in Kyllo v. United States. Most drone usage would not
constitute a search under Kyllo unless the information is from the
interior of the home—Kyllo did not consider drone surveillance of the
home’s non-interior areas. This drone surveillance would collect
information existing outside the home. Therefore, because this
information does not exist within the “interior of the home” and
presumably would not “otherwise have [required] a physical
201
‘intrusion, into a constitutionally protected area,’” Kyllo would not
apply to these types of drone surveillance. Kyllo would apply,
however, to scenarios where a drone uses sense-enhancing technology
to obtain information from within the home. In these circumstances,
202
the use of the drone, similar to the thermal imager in Kyllo, would
198. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
199. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417–18 (2013) (holding that the presence of a
police officer and drug-sniffing dog within the curtilage to investigate for illicit drugs constituted
an unreasonable search).
200. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235–36 (1986).
201. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
202. See id. at 29–31 (describing the thermal imager used on Kyllo’s home).
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constitute an unreasonable search by using sophisticated technology
not in general public use to obtain information from the home that
would have typically required a physical intrusion. For example, using
X-ray or infrared technology that is not in general public use to locate
persons within a home would violate the Kyllo rule and constitute an
unreasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Nonetheless, a dilemma arises when the information is obtained
by using an instrument to enhance details available from public areas.
For example, consider whether the use of vision-enhancement
technology to peer through an open window of a home on a secluded,
one-hundred-acre property would fall under Kyllo. Here, the
information is available from outside the home, but its availability by
naked-eye observation is restricted by the vast size of the private
203
property. Acquiring the information is possible, however, from
lawful areas (for example, a distant public road) with the visionenhancement technology. Because the sense-enhancing instrument is
necessary to acquire information from within the home and because a
physical trespass on the property or inside the home would be
necessary without the instrument, a court would confront conduct
falling somewhere between the Kyllo and Ciraolo scenarios.
Furthermore, the Court has not clarified when technology is
sufficiently within general public use to avoid a Fourth Amendment
violation. The Court’s earlier plurality opinion in Florida v. Riley that
helicopter travel was not sufficiently rare to raise a Fourth
204
Amendment violation indicated that only a marginal level of
prevalence might be necessary (given that not many people enjoy the
luxuries of helicopter travel). In light of Florida v. Riley and Kyllo,
drones would not yet be in general public use because of the FAA
regulations limiting their use almost exclusively to public entities in
limited circumstances. With the FAA Modernization Act and the
205
projected expansion of their use, however, drones will likely surpass
203. This scenario is similar to—but distinguishable from—United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S.
294 (1987). In Dunn, police officers trespassed onto Ronald Dunn’s property, passing several
fences and gates, and then looked into Dunn’s barn from an open field next to it, identifying a
laboratory for illicit drugs. Id. at 296–99. In the above scenario, if the government were to stand
in an open field on the property without a warrant and look through the window, the
government’s actions would constitute a trespass—but not a search—under Dunn and the openfields doctrine. This scenario, however, presumes that the government does not trespass onto
the property and conducts its surveillance from an area where it may lawfully do so.
204. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989) (plurality opinion).
205. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 332(a)(3), 126 Stat.
11, 73 (2012).
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the prevalence of helicopters in both the private and public sectors.
And many of the technologies employed by drones, such as cameras
and audio recorders, are already commonplace. Therefore, drones
will likely soon be within general public use under Kyllo, and many
forms of drone technology would already satisfy the general-use
standard.
C. Privacy-Rights Analysis of Drones
With its holding in Katz, the Supreme Court adopted a privacyrights framework for determining whether a search had occurred for
Fourth Amendment purposes. In Katz, Justice Harlan interpreted the
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as recognizing two key
206
elements for identifying a search. Under this inquiry, a search
generally occurs when persons “have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy” and when that expectation is “one that society
207
is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”
The Court in Jones alluded to the possible Fourth Amendment
inquiries that might be implicated in a case involving drone
technology. In Jones, the Supreme Court suggested that warrantless,
nontrespassory surveillance accomplished by traditional means
typically would not qualify as an unreasonable search under current
208
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The Court conceded, however,
that the same surveillance conducted “through electronic means”
209
might constitute “an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.” It
recognized that courts might have to confront these problems in a
“future case where a classic trespassory search is not involved,” but
210
declined to address that scenario.
Although the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test presents the
most viable Fourth Amendment doctrine to analyze drones, it has
been highly criticized since its inception. The test has been said to
211
“disappoint[] scholars and frustrate[] students for . . . decades.” It
has frequently been “criti[cized] as circular, . . . subjective and

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
(2007).

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012).
Id. at 954.
Id.
Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 503
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212

unpredictable.” Many legal texts forgo explaining the test, instead
213
simply listing the relevant cases and outcomes. With numerous
contrary holdings and no clear framework to analyze cases, a
reasonable expectation of privacy “has largely come to mean what a
214
majority of the Supreme Court Justices” says it means. Courts
might, and evidence suggests they do, misidentify what society
215
recognizes as a reasonable expectation of privacy. It has also been
216
criticized as a standard that erodes over time
because the
development of technology slowly erodes the public’s privacy
217
expectations and with it, the reasonable expectation of privacy.
The test’s current interpretation and application do not cover
many of the different types of surveillance conducted by drones.
There are two key problems with applying the reasonableexpectation-of-privacy test to drone surveillance. First, there might
not be a practical or reasonable way for persons unaware of their
exposure to drones to satisfy the subjective requirement of the test.
Second, as described above, the objectively reasonable requirement is
highly unpredictable and has resulted in an unclear and unworkable
standard.
1. The Subjective-Expectation-of-Privacy Requirement.
A
significant problem with applying the reasonable-expectation-ofprivacy test to drones is the subjective requirement of “exhibit[ing] an
218
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy.” When the Supreme
Court has addressed the subjective requirement, albeit infrequently, it
has looked to the presence of various expressive factors. In his
concurrence in Katz, Justice Harlan stated that the “objects, activities,
212. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (citations omitted).
213. Kerr, supra note 211, at 505.
214. ROBERT M. BLOOM, SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND WARRANTS 46 (2003).
215. See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings
Recognized and Permitted by Society”, 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 774 (1993) (conducting a survey of 217
participants and comparing the participants’ perceptions of whether different law-enforcement
investigations are unreasonable with analogous Supreme Court precedent, and concluding that
“the Supreme Court’s conclusions about the scope of the Fourth Amendment [that is, whether
certain governmental conduct is objectively reasonable and therefore does not implicate the
Fourth Amendment] are often not in tune with commonly held attitudes about police
investigative techniques”).
216. Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment
Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 121 (2002).
217. Id. at 139.
218. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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or statements that [a person] exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders”
fail the subjective requirement because the person exhibits no
219
intention of keeping these items private. Dow discussed the
220
subjective requirement at length, even though the case was decided
221
primarily under the curtilage and open-fields doctrines. Although
the Court disagreed on the probative value of the precautions taken
by Dow to protect the privacy of its property, both the majority and
the dissent mentioned several measures that might indicate a party’s
subjective expectation of privacy, including a perimeter fence,
222
security personnel, and other precautions against intrusion. The
Court in Ciraolo also considered a fence around Ciraolo’s property as
relevant to the subjective inquiry but concluded that the fence did not
establish whether he manifested a subjective expectation of privacy
223
from all types of observation.
Now consider drones with the capability to conduct surveillance
of entire cities, to collect aggregated data on persons that, when taken
together, may reveal intimate details, or to collect information
believed to be free from unwelcome eyes, ears, and other sensory
224
methods of detection. Each of these methods of surveillance can
reveal entirely new types of information, information that is
otherwise unattainable without detection, or information that is
otherwise prohibitively expensive or difficult to acquire when
obtained by traditional surveillance methods. Each makes it
impossible or implausible to “exhibit[] an actual (subjective)
225
expectation” and intention to keep these details private. And even
when it is possible and reasonable to exhibit an expectation of privacy
in these scenarios, the Court has failed to expound on what specific

219. Id.
220. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237–38 & n.4 (1986) (discussing the
lack of precautions taken by Dow to protect the privacy of its property). But see id. at 241–43 &
nn.1–3, 244 n.7, 247, 249 (Powell, J., dissenting) (discussing the surplus of precautions taken by
Dow to protect the privacy of its property).
221. See id. at 239 (finding that the industrial complex was more similar to an open field
than the curtilage).
222. See id. at 237 n.4 (discussing precautions taken to protect the privacy of a
constitutionally protected area); id. at 241–42 (Powell, J., dissenting) (same).
223. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211–12 (1986).
224. See, e.g., Finn, supra note 152 (discussing the planned deployment of drones to monitor
a small town in Afghanistan); Lloyd, supra note 175 (discussing ARGUS technology, which can
monitor and videotape fifteen square miles and track all moving objects within that area).
225. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
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actions or measures are necessary or sufficient to express a subjective
expectation of privacy besides basic precautions, such as perimeter
fences and closed phone booths.
There are significant difficulties associated with exhibiting an
actual subjective expectation of privacy from several types of drone
surveillance. Drones can utilize numerous surveillance methods and
can obtain countless types of information. Many people do not expect
certain information or details to be at risk of being exposed to others.
Consequently, many people will not take typical—or any—
precautions to protect the privacy of that information. Although
hardly anyone expects the government to monitor them and uncover
their personal information, this subjective expectation of privacy goes
beyond that bare belief that one is not under investigation and
extends to the expectation of privacy that people manifest by taking
ordinary precautions to protect information from exposure to third
parties. This idea extends both to information that people do not
expect to be exposed to others by any method as well as to
information that people do not expect to be exposed because of the
precautions they have taken.
Consider, for example, a drone with ARGUS technology,
constantly monitoring the location of an individual for a month or
226
longer. Or imagine the insect-like RoboBee conducting dragnet
monitoring of a city block and using sniffers to test the air around
individuals for specific biochemical agents undetectable by human
227
senses. Current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding the
subjective requirement does not inhibit the government from
conducting such investigations. A person moving in public “has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
228
another.” Furthermore, a party claiming a violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights by these governmental actions would fail the
subjective requirement because he has not exhibited his expectation
of privacy with respect to this information. Based on the Court’s
precedent of considering the specific privacy precautions taken, an
affected individual would likely fail to take a sufficient precaution,

226. See, e.g., Lloyd, supra note 175 (describing ARGUS technology and its surveillance
capabilities).
227. See, e.g., Khan, supra note 166 (describing the RoboBee); MAKEL ENG’G, INC., supra
note 183 (describing a drone that sniffs the air for chemical, biological, and narcotic agents).
228. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).

KOERNER IN FR (DO NOT DELETE)

1162

2/25/2015 11:35 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:1129

such as concealing his public movements or wearing specific garments
229
to conceal any smells or agents.
Additional problems arise when these measures are impossible
or implausible. In Dow, the vast property and safety concerns
230
prevented Dow from installing an overhead canopy. Had the Court
231
found the area to constitute the curtilage and not an open field, the
lack of a canopy—or a comparable precaution—would have likely
negated Dow’s expression of a subjective expectation of privacy for
232
the curtilage. It therefore seems that only a dome or structure
covering the entire two-thousand-acre property would have been
sufficient for the Court to find that Dow exhibited a subjective
expectation of privacy in activities occurring within the curtilage of
the property.
2. The Objective-Expectation-of-Privacy Requirement. There are
also significant problems with the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy
test’s objective requirement that “the [subjective] expectation be one
233
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Determining
whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable turns on “whether
the government’s intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal
234
values protected by the Fourth Amendment.”
Analyzing whether an expectation of privacy from drone
surveillance is objectively reasonable, however, seems to be an
informed guess, at best. The Supreme Court has neglected to adopt a
single test or approach to determine whether an expectation of
235
privacy is reasonable. The Court has considered many factors in
applying the test and has returned a series of “divergent and
236
conflicting” opinions and holdings. This approach has allowed the

229. These scenarios are more likely to turn on the facts of the case, specifically those
indicating the extent of the precautions taken and the risk of exposure of the information.
230. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 240 n.1 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(“The record establishes that Dow used the open-air design primarily for reasons of safety . . . .
Moreover, . . . Dow found that the cost of enclosing the facility would be prohibitive.”).
231. See id. at 239 (holding that the area was more analogous to an open field than to the
curtilage).
232. See id. at 236 (“The intimate activities associated with family privacy and the home and
its curtilage simply do not reach the outdoor areas or spaces between structures and buildings of
a manufacturing plant.”).
233. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
234. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182–83 (1984).
235. Kerr, supra note 211, at 525.
236. Wilkins, supra note 14, at 1080.
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237

lower federal courts to justify almost any result. Consequently, an
analysis of the reasonableness of drones will depend on their specific
use and various intangible factors. Thus, in nearly all Fourth
Amendment cases considering governmental surveillance by drones,
the objective reasonableness of a subjective expectation of privacy
seems up for grabs.
IV. REDEFINING THE REASONABLE-EXPECTATION-OFPRIVACY TEST
The reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test provides the most
viable approach for future cases considering whether the
government’s use of a drone constitutes an unreasonable search. In
applying this test, courts should focus more analysis on the subjectiveexpectation requirement and expand upon its existing interpretation
238
because this oft-neglected element of the two-pronged test is
especially relevant to drones.
In further addressing and clarifying the subjective requirement,
the analysis should proceed in three parts. First, a court should
determine whether the surveilled person “exhibited an actual
239
(subjective) expectation of privacy” so as to fall within the Fourth
Amendment’s protections. Second, if the person has exhibited a
subjective expectation of privacy, the court should then analyze the
scope of that privacy expectation and the information it covers.
Finally, the court should determine whether the person has exposed
240
that information to the “‘plain view’ of outsiders.”
A. The Reasonable-Expectation-of-Privacy Test
Adopting a versatile standard focused on the subjectiveexpectation-of-privacy test may provide the most effective approach
to reviewing drone surveillance. This flexible approach accounts for
both the diverse factual dynamics of Fourth Amendment cases and

237. See Kerr, supra note 211, at 525–26 (noting that categorization choices under a policy
model can be “completely arbitrary”).
238. See Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations,
81 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 2), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2448617. (“A majority of courts that apply
Katz do not even mention the subjective test; when the test is mentioned, it is usually not
applied; and when it is applied, it makes no apparent difference to case outcomes.”).
239. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
240. Id.
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the nebulous nature of nontrespassory Fourth Amendment issues. It
also provides a workable standard for drones and technology in the
modern age when the need for Fourth Amendment and privacy
protections extends beyond the home and the other traditionally
242
protected areas.
A significant problem with the current interpretation of the
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test is the manner in which the
courts have applied the test. Courts have more “flex[ed] than
243
Moreover, courts have focused almost
analy[zed]” the test.
exclusively on the objective requirement and neglected nearly any
244
analysis of the subjective-expectation requirement. Even when the
Supreme Court has addressed the subjective-expectation
requirement, it has often failed to clarify what measures are necessary
245
or sufficient to express a subjective expectation of privacy.
Realigning the scope of analysis from the objective requirement
to the subjective requirement would solve many of the problems with
applying the current interpretation of the reasonable-expectation-ofprivacy test to drones. Instead of attempting to analyze and ascertain
what expectations of privacy society as a whole would recognize as
reasonable, the subjective requirement looks to the specific factual
circumstances in determining whether an expectation exists. This
realignment would provide a clearer, more consistent analysis for trial
courts than the nebulous determinations of the objective
requirement.

241. See Kerr, supra note 211 (arguing against a single test or approach for determining the
reasonableness of an expectation of privacy because no single test or approach could properly
apply to the numerous issues presented by Fourth Amendment cases); supra Part I.A.
(discussing the factual dynamics of Fourth Amendment cases). But see Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170, 181–82 (1984) (“Th[e Supreme] Court repeatedly has acknowledged the
difficulties created for courts, police, and citizens by an ad hoc, case-by-case definition of Fourth
Amendment standards to be applied in differing factual circumstances. The ad hoc approach not
only makes it difficult for the policeman to discern the scope of his authority, it also creates a
danger that constitutional rights will be arbitrarily and inequitably enforced.” (citations
omitted)).
242. Wilkins, supra note 14, at 1079.
243. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
244. Kerr, supra note 238 (manuscript at 2) (“A majority of courts that apply Katz do not
even mention the subjective test; when the test is mentioned, it is usually not applied; and when
it is applied, it makes no apparent difference to case outcomes.”).
245. See supra text accompanying notes 222–23.
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B. The Subjective-Expectation-of-Privacy Requirement
1. Determining Whether a Subjective Expectation of Privacy
Exists. In determining whether a person holds a subjective
expectation of privacy in certain information, various factors might
indicate her intention to keep information private. The Supreme
246
Court has detailed some of these factors, but further attention and
clarification is needed. Moreover, these expressive factors are not
always needed to support a subjective expectation. Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence should come to recognize that in certain
situations, the lack of evidence exhibiting an expectation of privacy
results from the person’s belief that the information is at little or no
risk of being revealed to others. The lack of expressive factors,
therefore, may evidence a robust subjective expectation of privacy
that is still entitled to Fourth Amendment protection.
A person can express a subjective expectation of privacy through
different expressive factors. These factors “exhibit [an] . . . intention
247
to keep” certain information private. The location of the private
information is not determinative or necessary to negate this
expectation of privacy. Katz described this relationship as follows:
“What a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
248
constitutionally protected.”
Although expressive factors provide concrete evidence to
ascertain whether a subjective expectation of privacy exists, they may
be lacking in cases where the person believes there is little or no risk
of having her information revealed to others. In these cases, in which
the expectation of privacy is arguably strongest, few people would
take measures that would objectively evidence an expectation of
privacy. Courts should consider the probability of public exposure
and the practicality or reasonableness of taking different informationprotecting precautions when determining whether a subjective
expectation of privacy exists, even absent previously recognized
expressive factors.
For example, consider a RoboBee flying outside the curtilage
and immediate reaches of a property and recording a conversation
246. Id.
247. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
248. Id. at 351–52 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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occurring within the curtilage—audible from the public airways
overhead but not from the perimeter of the property. Here, most
people would not expect the conversation to be exposed to listeners
from above. A reasonable individual would believe that a sufficient
distance from the perimeter of the property, a normal speaking
volume, and an absence of any parties unwelcome to the conversation
would be sufficient to indicate that the conversation was intended to
be private. The speaker’s estimate of a marginal or zero probability of
this information being exposed to others demonstrates a subjective
expectation of privacy with respect to the information. The lack of
expressive factors alone does not fail to create a subjective
expectation. Instead, the expectation may be exhibited through
expressive actions or measures. A subjective expectation of privacy
must already exist before it may be exhibited. Expressive factors do
not create a subjective expectation; they exhibit it.
Under
other
circumstances,
the
impossibility
or
unreasonableness of taking certain measures to exhibit a subjective
expectation of privacy in information also may justify the failure to
exhibit any such factors. For example, consider again the hypothetical
of a RoboBee using sniffers to test the air around individuals for
biological and chemical agents emanating from their persons or
effects. If it were known that these investigations actually occurred,
people would have little or no opportunity to protect this information
and exhibit an expectation of privacy in it. Furthermore, even if some
precautions could be taken (for example, wearing a full-body hazmat
suit), these precautions would be unreasonable and would impose
costly and impractical burdens preventing many individuals from
taking such measures. Consequently, people would be subject to
these investigations without a feasible way to exhibit their subjective
expectation to keep this information private. Imagine if the
SolarEagle were used to monitor individuals’ locations over an
249
extensive span of time. If a person expects to keep his long-term
record of visits to his attorney or psychotherapist private, he would
not take burdensome precautions to conceal this information—
analogous to a fence around a yard or a closed door of a phone
booth—such as repetitively altering the route traveled, the office
visited, or his physical and vocal attributes at such meetings.

249. See, e.g., Roper, supra note 179 (reporting on a “license-plate reader” that digitally
recognized and recorded the exact location of the Minneapolis mayor’s vehicle at least forty-one
times over the course of a year).
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These two examples illustrate that the lack of measures
exhibiting an expectation of privacy does not negate a subjective
expectation of privacy in all circumstances. If it is found that no
measures were exhibited, courts determining whether the subjectiveexpectation requirement was satisfied should first consider the
assumed probability of exposure of the information. In addition, they
should consider the plausibility and reasonableness of exhibiting a
subjective expectation of privacy in that information. Surveilled
individuals might still satisfy the subjective requirement by showing
either that there was an assumed marginal risk that the information
would be exposed or that the only measures available to exhibit a
subjective expectation of privacy would have been implausible or
impracticable. If a court holds that the person did maintain a
subjective expectation of privacy despite the lack of expressive
factors, then the scope of that expectation, whether he exposed the
information to the plain view of others, and the objective
reasonableness of that expectation would still be relevant in
determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists to
establish a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
2. Determining the Scope of the Subjective Expectation of Privacy.
The scope of a person’s subjective expectation of privacy is also
relevant in determining whether a Fourth Amendment search
occurred. Under this inquiry, the scope of the expectation is critical to
understanding the extent of the information protected from
governmental intrusions. If an expectation of privacy to remain free
from intrusion by certain categories of sensory detection extends to
only some, but not other, types of information, then any information
falling outside of that scope would not be protected. Therefore, the
government’s acquisition of this unsheltered information would not
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.
Consider the Katz decision itself, in which the Court held that
the government’s recording of Katz’s telephone conversations in an
250
enclosed telephone booth constituted an unreasonable search. By
closing the door to the phone booth, Katz exhibited an expectation of
251
privacy for the oral content of his phone conversation. The closed
door, assuming it was transparent, would not exhibit Katz’s
expectation of privacy from visual observations, including his
250. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
251. Id. at 352.
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presence in the phone booth, his use of the telephone, and, possibly,
the telephone number he dialed or the contents of the conversation if
252
they were recorded by a lip reader observing the phone booth.
Therefore, the scope of Katz’s subjective expectation of privacy
extended to his oral conversation, but not to these physical
characteristics.
3. Determining Whether a Person Exposed Information to the
Plain View of Outsiders. Justice Harlan expanded on his reasonableexpectation-of-privacy test by clarifying that information “expose[d]
to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders [is] not ‘protected’” because no
253
intention to keep it private “has been exhibited.” When a person
exposes something to the plain view of the public, he also willingly
254
discloses certain information along with it. A voluntary disclosure,
however, does not forfeit all related expectations of privacy—or the
minimum protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.
255
Bond v. United States provides a key example of the scope of
an exposure of information to others, although the case was decided
256
using the objective-expectation-of-privacy requirement. In Bond, a
CBP officer checked bus passengers’ identifications and squeezed
257
luggage bags in the bus’s overhead bins to check for illicit drugs.
The officer squeezed Steven Bond’s bag and identified a “‘brick-like’
258
object,” which was found to be a package of methamphetamine.
The Supreme Court held that Bond had exhibited a subjective
expectation of privacy in the contents of his luggage bag by storing his
items within the bag and placing the bag in the overhead bin directly
259
above him. By placing the bag in the public bin, Bond exposed the
bag to typical visual observation and casual physical contact by others

252. DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 38, at 88; see Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (“But what he
sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not the intruding eye—it was the uninvited
ear.”).
253. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
254. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I
would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a
limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.”).
255. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
256. See id. at 338–39 (analyzing whether society would recognize Bond’s subjective
expectation as reasonable and holding that the government’s conduct violated his Fourth
Amendment rights).
257. Id. at 335.
258. Id. at 336.
259. Id. at 339.
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intending to move the bag. The extent of this public exposure,
however, did not invite or permit handling of the bag in a purposeful,
261
“exploratory manner.”
As Bond illustrates, the concept of information “expose[d] to the
‘plain view’ of outsiders,” articulated in Justice Harlan’s Katz
262
concurrence, relates to the level and extent of the exposure. Just as
Bond exposed his bag to only a certain level of observation and
handling, a public exposure does not forfeit all expectations of
privacy in the protected person or effects. Furthermore, the level of
the exposure of information that is readily detectable by others is
limited because the information must be exposed to the plain view of
the public. People do not expose information to the plain view of the
public when acquiring that information would require invasive, senseenhancing technology or long-term monitoring—surveillance that
reveals more information than a plain-view observer is able to
uncover.
For example, consider again a RoboBee equipped with a sniffer
to test the air for chemical and biological agents. A person probably
knows that any strong or detectable odors emanating from his body
or effects are susceptible to being smelled by others. The person
probably would not believe, however, that scents or agents
undetectable by the natural olfactory senses would be at risk of
exposure by advanced technology. Not only does he not knowingly or
willingly intend to expose this information, but this information is
also unavailable to the plain view and the natural senses of the public.
The government is able to elicit this information only by inspecting
the individual in a purposeful “exploratory manner,” similar to the
CBP officer squeezing the bag in Bond.
Another helpful illustration is the above-mentioned example of
an ARGUS-equipped SolarEagle, which monitors an individual for
an extended period of time. When the person steps into the public
view, he willingly exposes his person and effects to observation by
others. The SolarEagle, however, may uncover far more information
by compiling an extensive amount of data on the observed person’s
public activities. By aggregating this information, the SolarEagle
could produce a detailed log of every location the person has visited,
along with the dates, times, and durations of those visits. This
260. Id. at 338.
261. Id. at 338–39.
262. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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surveillance reveals more detailed information than what is available
to the plain view of the ordinary public observer.
Some might argue that by engaging in any activity, behavior, or
expression that is exposed to the public, an individual forfeits all
263
associated expectations of privacy. These opinions fail to recognize
that our private lives are not derived solely from the comings and
goings that transpire exclusively within the sanctity of the home. Our
private lives consist of numerous activities, behaviors, and expressions
264
occurring at home, in public, at work, and in society as a whole—
both in solitude and in the presence of others. Secrecy does not
equate to privacy and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence must come
265
to reflect this distinction. Although expectations of privacy may be
nebulous, individuals still expect certain information to remain
private and free from government intrusion. This is the very heart of
the Fourth Amendment. And as long established by the Supreme
266
Court, “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”
The extent and level of exposure of information to the plain view
of the public is especially relevant to drone technology. Just as a
“careful [tactile] exploration of the outer surfaces of a person’s
clothing all over his or her body” violates the sanctity of his body and
267
the level and extent of information he exposes to the public,
invasive explorations and investigations of a person or her effects by
drones may also violate this sanctity and the extent of the information
she has exposed. Thus, by driving an automobile down a public road,
263. Cf. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182 (1984) (“[W]e reject the suggestion that
steps taken to protect privacy establish that expectations of privacy in an open field are
legitimate.”); Katz, 389 U.S. at 365 (Black, J., dissenting) (applying a textualist interpretation to
a Fourth Amendment issue and concluding that “[a] conversation overheard by eavesdropping,
whether by plain snooping or wiretapping, is not tangible and, under the normally accepted
meaning of the words, can neither be searched nor seized”).
264. In the workplace context, the Supreme Court has “recognized that employees may
have a reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusions by police” and “[g]iven the societal
expectations of privacy in one’s place of work[,] . . . [has] rejected the contention . . . that public
employees can never have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their place of work.”
O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 716–17 (1987). This expectation of privacy, however, “must
be assessed in the context of the employment relation.” Id. at 717.
265. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“But
whatever the societal expectations [for privacy], [persons] can attain constitutionally protected
status only if our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a prerequisite to
privacy.”); Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 (“The test of [Fourth Amendment] legitimacy is not whether
the individual chooses to conceal assertedly ‘private’ activity.” (emphasis added)).
266. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
267. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 337 (2000) (alteration in original) (quoting Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1968)).
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a person exposes the exterior portions of the car to the public, and a
law-enforcement officer’s observation of the car does not constitute a
268
search. However, many people—including, perhaps, members of the
Supreme Court—would find it deeply disturbing for the government
269
to monitor their every move in public. Drones render such
monitoring possible. Public movements, however, should not be
deemed to expose to the public’s plain view an intricate, detailed map
of the exact dates, times, and locations of an individual over an
extensive period of time. Similarly, individuals should not be deemed
to expose the biological and chemical agents emanating from their
persons and effects, which may be detected by the hovering
RoboBee, to the plain view of the public.
CONCLUSION
When issues concerning the use of drones by the government
arise, courts should apply the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test
and expand on the subjective-expectation-of-privacy requirement. In
applying the test, they should determine whether there is a subjective
expectation of privacy, whether the scope of that privacy expectation
extended to the acquired information, and then whether the person
exposed the information to the plain view of the public. Analysis of
the subjective requirement, however, should not be overlooked as
courts have commonly done. Courts should also recognize that an
absence of expressive factors exhibiting a subjective expectation of
privacy does not defeat a subjective requirement. Expressive factors
merely evidence the existence of a subjective expectation; they do not
create it. When expressive factors are absent, an individual can still
demonstrate that a subjective expectation existed. Finally, courts
should also recognize that a subjective expectation of privacy extends
to a defined scope of information and that an exposure of this
information forfeits the Fourth Amendment protections attached
only to the information that is exposed to the plain view of the public.
The analysis outlined in this Note provides guidance for
resolving many of the current difficulties in applying Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence to drones. These difficulties are especially
troubling given the numerous practical benefits that drones could
268. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114 (1986).
269. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 9–16, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259) (asking
whether the government may, without a warrant, monitor the Supreme Court Justices’ public
movements for a month).
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provide to law enforcement and others. The advancement and
successes of drone technology, however, will likely be achieved only if
there is a proper balance between the government’s investigative
powers and an individual’s constitutional rights, as the Fourth
Amendment seeks to achieve. Future cases considering the
government’s use of drones for surveillance should recognize the
critical analysis provided by the subjective requirement. Perhaps only
then will Fourth Amendment jurisprudence find an appropriate
balance between governmental surveillance by drones and the Fourth
Amendment’s protections from governmental intrusion.

